Administrative Appeal Decision - Lee, Thomas (2019-02-06) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
December 2020 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Lee, Thomas (2019-02-06) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Lee, Thomas (2019-02-06) 2019-02-06" (2020). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/434 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Thomas Lee (99B2007) 
Mohawk Correctional Facility 
6514 Rt. 26, P.O. Box 8450 
Rome, New York 13440 
Mohawk CF 
08-006-18 B 
Decision appealed: Jttly 2018 decision; deHying cl:iseretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Crangle, Coppola. 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived November 5, 2018 
Appeals Unit Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Review: 
Records relied·upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo hearing Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo hearing Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of A(>'peals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
'This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separa~ findings. ~f 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed t.o the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on .;2/l~ /;"?' 6~ . 
/ , 
f i; ,:1 ihu1i11n: Apr..:als ! !nit . ..\ppcllam - Appdlan1's Counsel - l1~sf. Pu.role File - Central File 
I'- ..::n11.~1B i l JI ;2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Lee, Thomas DIN: 99-B-2007
Facility: Mohawk CF AC No.: 08-006-18 B
Findings: (Page 1 of 3)
Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold.  Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s 
determination was arbitrary and capricious and made in violation of applicable law; (2) the Board’s 
determination was made in violation of Appellant’s due process rights under the Constitution; and 
(3) the Board relied solely upon the very serious nature of the crimes of conviction, and insufficient 
weight was given to his institutional achievements, release plans, and certain scores contained in 
his COMPAS instrument.    
Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, 
this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY 
Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails to satisfy any one of the considerations 
set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter 
of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. 
Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); 
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely 
within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 
N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; 
Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 
(1st Dept. 1997).   
In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
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State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4). 
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-
by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  
The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to 
apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the 
COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 
1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that 
the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the 
three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 
1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 
994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight 
does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 
815 (3d Dept. 2016).  
An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 
1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005); Duemmel v. Fischer, 368 Fed. Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010); Yourdon v. 
Johnson, No. 01-CV-0812ESC, 2006 WL 2811710, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006); Matter of 
Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003) 
(inmate has no protected liberty interest in parole release once his minimum sentence is served).  
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
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of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d 
Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  At 
most, inmates may have “minimal due process rights” that are limited to not being denied parole 
for constitutionally arbitrary or impermissible reasons, which requires a showing of egregious 
official conduct.  Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012); accord Bottom v. Pataki, 610 
Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. 2015); Borrell v. Superintendent of Wende Corr. Facility, No. 12-CV-6582 
CJS MWP, 2014 WL 297348, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), appeal dismissed (Oct. 31, 2014). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
